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PRÉCIS 
This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on islands. This 
hypothesis offers a foundational,  sub-game  solution to The Island  Survival  Game, a  counter-
intuitive,  dominant  economic  development  strategy  for  ‘islands’  (and  relatively  insular 
states). This discourse also tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite analytical tools, and 
a guiding principle for The Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay supergame which models 
The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development at the global level. We begin our exploration 
with an introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for 
‘island’ and ‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model ‘island’ economic development with 
two bio-geo-politico-economic models and respective strategies: The Mustique Co. Development 
Plan, and The Prince Edward Island Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic Advancement. 
These diametrically opposed strategies offer an extraordinary comparative study. One island 
serves as a highly descriptive model for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development; the 
other model informs ESS. The Earth Island Survival Game serves as a remarkable learning tool, 
offering  lessons  which  promote  islander  survival,  resource  holding  power,  cooperative 
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On the Problem of Island Life 
This short discourse presents an abridgement of an open 
letter to The Linnean Society of London (1), sent 12 
February of 2009 (cf. 2); a critical and germane game-
theoretical finding (3) was enclosed therein. (1) offers an 
exhaustive exploration of the problem and solution at 
hand, including a contextual introduction, a dozen in-
depth appendices, a cornucopia of discursive and expansive 
footnotes, and a handy glossary. Please refer to this source 
for a more detailed and in-depth review of the theory 
presented herewith. (4) offers a supplementary glossary 
which may also prove useful. 
An the Nonexistence of Subject Matters (cf. 5) 
As word of Humboldt's death filtered around the 
world,  there  was an outpouring of… reverence 
befitting a beloved international celebrity…. The 
Herald lauded him as ‘one of the greatest men of 
his age or of any other age.... He had a gigantic 
intellect,  from  which  nothing  in  nature  or  in 
science  appeared  to be  hid.  He  could  grasp all 
subjects, and he appeared to know everything.... 
Cosmos is his imperishable monument, which will 
endure as long as the earth which it describes.’ 
The Tribune averred, ‘His fame belonged not only 
to Europe, but to the world; and in this country 
especially, probably no man who was known to us 
only  through  the  medium  of  his  scientific 
writings  was  held  in  equal  reverence  and 
admiration....  But  what  will  ever  distinguish 
Humboldt  from  the  mass  of  physical  inquirers 
who  had  preceded  him,  is  his  study  of  the 
universe as a harmonious whole, and his search for 
the  laws of order, beauty, and majesty beneath 
the  apparent  confusion  and  contradictions  of 
isolated appearances….’ 
     We may well ask, If Humboldt was so widely 
celebrated and so beloved during his long life…, 
why  has  he  been  largely  forgotten  in  our  own 
time?....  
     Above  all  he  was  a  generalist,  intent  on 
examining every natural process and shaping the 
myriad discordant data into a coherent whole, as 
in  Cosmos.  However,  by  the  mid-nineteenth 
century,  science…  was  increasingly  becoming 
the province of specialists, as shown by the trend 
to  replace  university  departments  of  Natural 
Philosophy with the narrower disciplines that we 
know today (6:327-330). 
Indeed, this trend has led to spectacular failures and 
deeply entrenched problems ranging from the maladaptive 
contrivance of the ‘social sciences’ (7) to the 
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (8, cf. 9-
12). Although Sir Karl Popper, F.A. von Hayek and other 
great problem-solvers have fought to correct these 
errors, 
it is easy to call for interdisciplinary syntheses, 
but will anyone respond? Scientists know how to 
train  the  young  in  narrowly  focused  work;  but 
how  do  you  teach  people  to  stitch  together 
established  specialties  that  perhaps  should  not 
have been separated in the first place (13:682)? 
I had set off more than a decade ago in search of a solution 
to what I thought was an ‘economic’ problem, but, over 
time, I recognized that the problem was insoluble through 
the narrow lens of ‘economics,’ and, moreover, that 
‘economics’ and the other so-called ‘social sciences’ 
were essentially, creating the problem I was struggling to 
solve. Birds are a part of nature, as are the nests they 
construct– that is straightforward enough for most to 
grasp. Humans – and the houses, cars, ICBM’s, etc. – are 
also part of nature, but this is not so readily grasped. 
Humans are not ‘encroaching’ upon nature – we are part of 
it. This has been quite clear since 1859. When gray 
wolves (Canis lupus) or the wild dogs of Africa (Lycaon 
pictus) fight, form packs, and hunt collectively, and claim 
territory with urine, we recognize this behaviour as pack-
hunting, but when Homo sapiens fight, form packs, and 
hunt collectively (by waging wars and claiming territory 
with national boundaries and/or EEZ, for example), the 
analogy eludes us more often than not. 
     Though I am a citizen of the United States of America 
and a member of The American Society of Naturalists, in 
light of the fact that the two island-based research papers 
which influenced this theoretical development the most 
were fruits of the Linnean Society of London, Burlington 
House seemed to offer the most appropriate address for 
this communiqué. Although I need not comment upon the 
first paper (14), I suspect the content and significance of 
the second may remain largely unknown.  
     Given the scope of our endeavour, we must cover 
much ground in little time, and thus, as noted in a letter 
(15) delivered (16) to the inhabitants of the Åland islands 
last summer: 
Although  time  will  presently  not  enable  us  to 
scratch the surface of the islands I love most, we 
will explore specific  inter-dependencies relating 
to  several,  and,  moreover  three  fundamental 
qualities which relate to them all:   
(i)  The  inhabitants  of  these  islands  have 
demonstrated  exceptional  and  enduring 
preferences for relative insularity, (ii) they have Page 4 of 17 
maintained this preference through independence, 
Darwinian fitness (Resource Holding Power, 17), and 
(iii) thus these islands are relatively valuable (15). 
On The Principle of Relative Insularity 
In short, the Struggle for Life on the islands I love, those I 
do not, and the island of Earth alike, is regulated—past, 
present, and future—by a principle which has regulated 
life on earth for the past 4.5 billion years, the very same 
law which regulates the survival of every living organism 
on earth yet today, the very same law which regulates the 
survival of men, women, children, dragonflies, bison, 
hedge funds, ranches, islands, nations, island nations, 
currencies, and inhabitable planets alike; this theory 
clearly illuminates the true nature of the nonrandom 
gauntlet all organisms must run, but casts an especially 
bright light upon Homo sapiens and nations (‘individual’ 
nations, that is, which neither connotes nor denotes The 
Theory of Group Selection). The Principle of Relative Insularity 
demonstrates how Darwinian fitness is won and lost 
through the deployment or failure to deploy evolutionary 
stable strategies, to gain and maintain relative insularity with 
Resource Holding Power.   
      Although it may be ideal to consider the term 
‘relative insularity’ at length – alas, this brief 
communiqué is not the proper forum, thus I must merely 
remark that ‘insulated’ represents our touchstone of 
choice insofar as ‘insularity’ is concerned, and, going 
forward, perhaps the most relevant conjecture to consider 
is that “insularity is a condition that offers a balance of 
advantages and disadvantages, opportunities and threats, 
whether applied to islands, communities, areas or 
economies” (18:368). I must also offer a quick example of 
the type of entirely false notion to which I had referred. 
For example, it is commonly suggested that 
insularity  can  be  largely  defined  as  a  situation 
deriving  from  the  nature  of  insular  areas  or 
islands, whereas islands are strictly bounded areas 
with specific geographical characteristics such as 
land  discontinuity,  distance  from  the  mainland 
and remote location at sea. These characteristics 
have negative effects on the economic and social 
development  of  insular  areas  and  constitute  a 
basic environmental feature; isolation is generally 
regarded  in  human  terms  as  a  disadvantageous 
situation, and therefore development planning are 
often orientated towards its reduction (19:171). 
Yes, “insularity is normally considered to be economically 
disadvantageous” (20:195). But we shall soundly refute and 
falsify this widely held à-priori assumption. This task it 
not difficult to accomplish on the evolutionary front; thus 
our challenge rests with, and will thus be focused upon, 
the falsely held notions of many influential economic 
theorists and the hecatombs of civilization under their 
sway (cf. 21). 
     (15) attempted to illustrate the dominant role relative 
insularity has played in the natural histories of many of the 
islands I value the most, here I will focus upon one: a 
small, arid, treasure island—an island, ironically—
amongst the ‘lesser’ of the lesser Antilles: Mustique. 
Which brings us to the second priceless account of natural 
history to which I had referred.  
     (15) chronicled the unearthing of a treasure, a paper 
(22) out of the University College, London, which was 
accepted for publication in April of I973 in what seems to 
this writer to be the single-most appropriate Journal for 
any such gem: The Biological Journal of the Linnean Society. 
I opened this treasure-chest (22), carefully assessed the 
glimmering stones and nutritious minerals within, and, 
when I had had my fill and was about to close the lid, a 
faint sparkle on the final page caught my eye: 
LLEWELYN-DAVIE,  WEEKS,  FORESTIER-
WALKER & BOR, 1970. Mustique: proposals for a 
development study. Unpubl. Rep. 
I googled for hours, emailed for days, searched for 
months, but, alas, I could not put my hands on it. My 
enthusiasm faded. I tried to forget about it. But I 
couldn’t. Yes, I suspected it may be valuable. But I 
certainly did not recognize, and could not imagine that it 
was the very grail I had set off in search of over a decade 
ago. 
In Search of the Unity of Nature 
Since ‘all things living are in search of a better world’ 
(23), and in light of the fact that the ‘better world’ I 
sought was a bio-geo-politico-economic model far more 
descriptive than any mathematical model could offer, a 
‘little world in itself’ capable of modelling the ‘unity of 
nature’ on the big island we refer to as ‘Earth’; I soon 
recognized that I had no choice but to set sail for the 
torrid zone: 
For Humboldt,  ‘the unity of nature’  meant the 
interrelation of all…sciences….  
     Instead  of  trying  to  pigeonhole  the  natural 
world  into  prescribed  classifications,  Kant  had 
argued,  scientists  should  work  to  discover  the 
underlying  scientific  principles  at  work,  since 
only those general tenets could fully explain the 
myriad natural  phenomena.…  Humboldt  agreed 
with Kant that a different approach to science was 
needed, one that could account for the harmony 
of  nature...  The  scientific  community,  despite Page 5 of 17 
prodigious discoveries, seemed to have forgotten 
the  Greek  vision  of  nature  as  an  integrated 
whole….  ‘Rather  than  discover  new,  isolated 
facts  I  preferred  linking  already  known  ones 
together,’ Humboldt later wrote. Science could 
only  advance  ‘by  bringing  together  all  the 
phenomena and creations which the earth has to 
offer. In this great sequence of cause and effect, 
nothing can be  considered in isolation.’ It  is  in 
this  underlying  connectedness  that  the  genuine 
mysteries of nature would be found. 
     This  was  the  deeper  truth  that  Humboldt 
planned  to  lay  bare…  For  only  through  travel, 
despite its accompanying risks, could a naturalist 
make  the  diverse  observations  necessary  to 
advance  science  beyond  dogma  and  conjecture. 
Although nature operated as a cohesive  system, 
the world was also organized into distinct regions 
whose unique character was the result of all the 
interlocking  forces  at  work  in  that  particular 
place.  To uncover the unity of nature, one must 
study the various regions of the world, comparing 
and contrasting the natural processes at work in 
each. 
The scientist, in other words, must become 
an explorer (6:23-27). 
Yes, I did explore. And yes, I did eventually find it (24 ; 
cf. 1). Moreover, as I have implied, I found much more. 
On the Problem of Survival on Earth 
I will offer a brief preview of The Earth Island Survival 
Game to help set the stage (the Earth) upon which our 
subgame, The Island Survival Game takes place: 
     The Earth Island Survival Game consists of two classes 
of ‘players’, ‘Globalized Economic Military Superpowers’ 
(GEMS) and ‘Relatively Insular States’ (RIS); although The 
Island Survival Game is a game played by individuals (Homo 
sapiens) on a single island, we shall briefly compare and 
contrast both global players from the larger and more 
complicated game. Although (1) defines both GEMS and 
RIS, in this brief abstract we’ll simply conceptualize 
these two player classes as ‘Continental’ (GEMS) and 
‘Island’ (RIS) based economies. (i) Astrophysical 
uncertainty, and (ii) the fact that the Earth is a planet 
lacking central authority both further complicate The 
Earth Island Survival Game, and although we have much to 
discover in our forthcoming explorations of these 
stochastic elements, for the time being we’ll merely 
contextualize them in outline form: 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GAME? 
GEMS vs. GEMS 
GEMS vs. RIS 
RIS vs. RIS 
GEMS ∪ RIS vs. Universe 
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE GAME? 
GEMS = Survival → +(IR) 
RIS = Survival → +(IR) 
Universe = ? 
HOW IS THE OBJECTIVE ATTAINED? 
GEMS = RHP 
RIS = RHP 
Universe = ? 
WHAT STRATEGIES ARE AVAILABLE? 
S1: Maximum Economic Development (MED) 
S2:  Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP) 
ESS? 
RIS = Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP) 
GEMS = Maximum Economic Development (MED) 
For the time being, please tentatively accept that survival 
is attained by ‘→ +(IR)’, an indirect proof of The Principle 
of Relative Insularity (and our theory of value based upon 
relative insularity) ; these arguments are extensive, 
necessarily exhaustive, and beyond the scope of this 
abstract. However, to make a very long argument very 
short, Value (V) is a derivative function (f´) of relative 
insularity (IR), ⇒ V= f´(IR), and this, in a nutshell is why 
our objective is: ‘→ +(IR)’ 
     When rational play unfolds, equilibrium is attained 
when players pursue respective rational, opposing ESS, 
offering optimal windfall: RIS-driven ecological protection 
and GEMS-driven planetary protection. In essence, this 
non-cooperative, strategic equilibrium paves the way for 
rational, mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, 
yields higher ecological and planetary insularities, and thus 
maximizes (i) economic value and (ii) Darwinian 
fitness/RHP. RIS maximize (i & ii) by pursuing self-
interests, by struggling for maximum ecological insularity & 
economic value (through ecological preservation, politico-
economic independence, self-sufficiency). GEMS 
maximize (i & ii) by pursuing self-interests, by fighting 
for maximum economic development (i.e. ‘globalization’), and 
planetary insularity. 
     Surplus value is maximized through strategic 
transparency: If (a) all players recognize the value of 
respective, opposing, and antithetical, rational strategies 
and employ the ESS, then (b) all players maximize Page 6 of 17 
economic value & Darwinian fitness, negotiate, struggle, 
fight, communicate, and cooperate more rationally, more 
efficiently, more peacefully, and thus (c) maximum 
sustainable economic development is achieved and human 
survival prospects are maximized. 
     As introduced in  (15-16), roughly sketched here, and 
detailed in (1), perhaps the most revelatory feature of 
sub-game play is that GEMS ESS and RIS ESS are 
antithetical, yet in light of The Problem of Induction, we 
discover these naturally opposing – and complementary – 
strategies represent the strategic equilibrium, the most 
tenable, rational solution possible. 
     How is it possible that the two classes of players 
derive two different, antithetical, optimal strategies when 
utilizing the same theory of value?  
Simply because they both happen to represent the 
dominant (best) strategy for each player class to achieve 
greater insularity: → +(IR). 
     For example, when RIS employ GEMS ESS, as they 
invariably have and continue to do, given their inherent 
disadvantages in terms of economies of scope, scale, and 
location theory, through the deleterious effects of the 
amplification by compression of negative externalities, 
they destroy their ecology and, in rather short order, 
their economies, as well. Their trajectory, in short, 
becomes → - (IR). 
     Although some may be willing to entertain the 
conjecture that RIS ESS = Maximum Ecological 
Protection (MEP), perhaps many may find my inherently 
controversial finding that GEMS ESS = Maximum 
Economic Development (MED) unpalatable. Again, 
although The Earth Island Survival Game is not our focus 
here, I will briefly remark that, although human survival  
ultimately depends upon a single, unified, life-giving 
sphere of insularity, it must ultimately be defended on two 
inherently uncertain levels: (i) insularity pertaining to the 
biosphere (i.e. Ecology, the ‘whole world’ according to 
the principles of ‘ecological economics’), and (ii) 
insularity pertaining to the semi-closed island of Earth, 
including stochastic political phænomena (warfighting) 
and stochastic planetary and extra-planetary phænomena 
(meteorites, volcanoes, chaotic gravitational forces, 
supernovas, stochastic and anthropogenic climate change, 
the Earth’s inherently unknown and unknowable lifespan, 
etc.). Thus, resources must be split between two 
contradictory, yet complimentary objectives, but it is 
impossible to determine how much to allocate to each 
over time (cf. 3). 
On the Problem of Survival on Islands 
States, Microstates and Islands tables a widely held and 
generally accepted conjecture: 
Theoretically, an island country has two options. 
It  can  remain  a  small  closed  society… 
Alternatively it can… [become] integrated with 
the world economy through the promotion of the 
type of development which allows for greater and 
more beneficial exchange. In fact, the first is not 
really  an  option.  There  are  few,  if  any,  small 
islands  which  having  had  access  to  certain 
amenities have rejected them (25:155). 
Although it is true that, theoretically, there are indeed 
just two development options for an island to pursue (MEP 
and MED)—the conclusion tabled above is entirely 
unfounded: In reality, the first option (MEP) is the only 
option, as the second (MED) – though it may stimulate a 
flurry of short-term economic gains – will invariably 
degenerate into The Tragedy of the Commons. Furthermore, 
once this truly tragic and depauperative state has been 
reached, few options – other than political revolution are 
available to the island population in order to stave off 
ecological and (eventually) economic collapse.  
     Ceteris paribus, RIS may select only one pure 
development strategy. Once a pure strategy has been 
selected and put into motion, it is extraordinarily difficult 
to switch development strategies after the corresponding 
linkages – industries, institutions, and trade – develop and 
inter-dependencies become entrenched (which is why we 
play ‘delay’ games). This dilemma is exacerbated by the 
fact that most political decisions are made to maximize 
value on a very short-term basis, rarely exceeding four-
year windows of politico-economic development 
opportunity (as in the case of a single term for U.S. 
Presidency), but, in many worst-case constitutional 
scenarios, elections may be called at virtually any time, 
such as in the case of the election of the Prime Minister’s 
of Canada (cf. 26). 
      Given this constitutional arrangement, RIS 
democratic majorities invariably elect present 
consumption (MED) over future preservation (MEP) and, 
especially if the climate is right for the tourist trade (i.e. 
the Caribbean), rapidly degenerate into The Tragedy of the 
Commons.  
     Yes, theoretically, an island country has two options – 
MED and MEP – and, this is the expected payoff matrix: 
Strategy  Short-Term Payoff  Long-Term Payoff 
MED  $-Rich/Land-Poor  $-Poor/Land-Poor 
MEP  Land-Rich/$-Poor  Land Rich/$-Rich 
 
Table 1: ‘Island’ Economic Development Strategy Payoff Matrix Page 7 of 17 
Although (25)’s observation that ‘few, if any’ small 
islands have elected MEP over MED is quite accurate, 
there are at least a half-dozen islands (Mustique, Molokai, 
and several small islands off the coast of Maine, e.g.) 
known to this author who have elected the first option.  
     Let’s take in an overview of the structure of The Island 
Survival Game before moving on to our models… 
 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GAME? 
 Islander vs. Islander 
Islander vs. Invader 
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE GAME? 
Islander = Survival → +(IR) 
Invader = Survival → +(IR) 
HOW IS OUR OBJECTIVE ATTAINED? 
Islander = RHP 
Invader = RHP 
WHAT STRATEGIES ARE AVAILABLE? 
S1: Maximum Economic Development (MED) 
S2:  Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP) 
ESS? 
MEP: Maximum Ecological Preservation 
 
The Island Survival Game is an asymmetric, bounded delay 
supergame. The game is bounded by a finite duration of 
≈50,000 years, and a ‘delay’ of 87 years transpires 
between moves, in other words, once a strategy has been 
selected, the opportunity to ‘switch’ strategies does not 
come along for another 87 years. The logic behind the 
‘boundedness’ of our game follows from (3). “The 
distinction between bounded and unbounded delay 
supergames is theoretically important,” (27:202); for 
example, the central thesis of ‘ecological economics’ is 
founded upon a false, a-priori assumption that the truly 
noncooperative game of life on Earth is ‘unbounded’— 
but it is not, because “an upper bound… can be named for 
the survival of any economic situation,” (27:224), and as 
detailed in (3),  ≈50,000 years represents the logical 
upper limit for the survival of both the evolutionary and 
economic situation on Earth. The game is over – quite 
literally – in ≈50,000 years. 
     As far as the ‘delay’ is concerned, as Selten remarked, 
“it does not really matter exactly how long the delays are, 
choosing one delay period over another is largely 
insignificant” (27:202); the purpose is merely to help 
illustrate the fact that, once economic development 
strategies are selected and the resultant inter-
dependencies become entrenched, under democratic rule, 
it is extremely difficult to switch strategies—the delay 
helps conceptualize and emphasize the long-lasting effects 
of these strategic decisions. For example, as we shall 
momentarily discover, the politico-economic 
development strategies currently being deployed on the 
two islands which model our problem and solution are the 
same strategies which were put into play in 1970—and 
there is no sign that either islands intends (and, 
moreover, is able) to ‘switch’ strategies anytime in the 
near future. Thus, the ‘delay’ for these two living and 
evolving bio-geo-politico-economic models, is > 40 
years. In any case, however, for the purpose of our 
analysis, it seems the most fruitful delay may be between 
70 and 100 years—the somewhat arbitrary delay of 87 
years was selected in-part for sentimental reasons (28 ; cf. 
29). 
     Our games are ‘asymmetric’ (cf. 30-31) because, 
naturally, the conflicts at hand are asymmetric: If a home 
is listed for sale on the island of Mustique for $50MM 
USD, the strategies employed for contesting for this 
property will not be ‘mixed’ – they will be informed by 
the readily apparent asymmetries relating to RHP ($) ; 
mixed (random) strategies – such as knocking on the front 
door and boldly proclaiming ownership, attempting to 
take the home by force, or writing a long, eloquent, and 
flattering letter to the owner, begging for this territory 
and shelter as a gift – are all highly unlikely to result in 
the legal transfer of deeded title – and thus control, of 
this scarce resource. Likewise, as we discover in The 
Earth Island Survival Game (cf. 1), the Seychelles, for 
example, would not employ a ‘mixed’ strategy (such as 
flipping a coin) when deliberating whether or not to 
declare war upon The United States and China for refusing 
to be held accountable to the Kyoto Protocol. The nature 
of these contests are also clearly asymmetric – in the 
case of The Earth Island Survival Game, RHP = $ = military 
power (cf. 1). 
     One final – yet crucial – pre-game announcement is 
that, ceteris paribus, ‘islanders’ wield a natural ‘home-
court’ advantage over ‘invaders’ (cf. 31). 
     With these introductory notes in mind, The Island 
Survival Game serves as an excellent learning tool.  
     Although we will not delve into specific gameplay 
scenarios, the game-theoretical negotiations common to 
all games, readers may refer to (31) as a relevant resource 
in the meantime. If we use a bit of imagination at this 
juncture, however, the nature of the game, and thus 
gameplay, may already be clear.  
     Moreover, we may also recognize that, ceteris paribus, 
based upon revealed 20th  & 21st century preferences, with 
very few notable exceptions – default RIS strategy (MED) Page 8 of 17 
has been sub-optimal/maladaptive. This assessment 
applies to nearly all of the warm-water, small island 
developing states and sub-national island jurisdictions. 
With the exception of cold-water islands (cf. 32) and 
other extremely remote islands (i.e., St. Helena, 
Pitcairn, Tristan da Cunha, etc.), RIS players operating in 
the real world have nearly all discovered and/or are in the 
process of discovering that “the short-term advantages of 
free riding may fulfil Hardin’s prediction that ‘freedom in 
the commons brings ruin to all’” (33:2294).  
     However, with one significant exception (industrial 
agricultural production, cf. 6, Axiom V), 20th & 21st century 
GEMS strategy has, contrary to prevailing sentiments, 
been optimal. In other words, in several regards, the 
global prognosis in not nearly as dire as many influential 
theorists (e.g., 34) have led many to believe (though it is 
perhaps more dire in many regards which they have failed 
to detect: cf. 1). 
On The Tragedy of the Commons 
This  problem  remains  one  of  the  most-cited  concepts 
because it represents the very essence of The Problem of 
Sustainable  Economic  Development.  Yes,  this  problem  is 
complex, but I hope we may have begun to demonstrate 
that  it  may  be  fruitfully  simplified  with  the  bio-geo-
politico-economic  models  we  refer  to  ‘islands’.  And 
perhaps one of the most accurate and descriptive models 
of our problem is Prince Edward Island. 
      The Development Plan for Prince Edward Island (cf. 1), in 
contradistinction to The Mustique Co. Development Plan (cf. 
1), offers an extraordinary comparative study. Prince 
Edward Island also happens to offer one of the most 
accurate, realistic, descriptive, and readily studied bio-
geo-politico-economic models of The Problem of Sustainable 
Economic Development. 
     (35) chronicles the ten-year debate, scientific 
investigations, and end-game decision to construct a one 
billion dollar bridge from Prince Edward Island to New 
Brunswick. Objections to building the bridge were many, 
but perhaps the most significant objection was over the 
substantial empirical and theoretical evidence which 
indicated that building the bridge would destroy the 
south-shore fishery, arguably the island’s most valuable 
economic resource (cf. 15 ; 36-37). 
     PEI Premier Ghiz had assured his fellow islanders 
throughout the ten-year process that the province would 
defer to the guidance of the one and only official and 
impartial Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel, which 
was commissioned and published in August of 1990. This 
report,  
which  resulted  from  over  a  year  of  study  and 
public hearing into...  [the] bridge proposal...  is 
quite  explicit  and  clear-cut  about  the  proposed 
bridge:  On two occasions the report said, in bold 
print, “The Panel recommends, therefore, 
that the project not proceed” (35:6). 
And, ironically, a testament to this recommendation was 
nearly visible to the naked eye from PEI: across the 
Northumberland Straight stands the Canso causeway, a 
link whose history offered much to help inform the 
Confederation bridge strategy a half-century prior: 
In 1944, a federal committee recommended that 
a  fixed  link  be  constructed…  During  the 
remainder  of  the  1940s,  Post-Record  publisher 
H.P.  Duchemin was relentless in his use of his 
editorial  space  to promote  and push  for a  fixed 
link…  On  28  February 1944,  Duchemin  wrote 
that  lack of an alternative  to the  ferry crossing 
‘…is an insurmountable hurdle to the industrial 
progress of the Province….’ 
     On 1 March 1944 Duchemin said there  was 
‘great  necessity  for  this  long  overdue 
modernizing’  and  quoted  Nova  Scotia  Premier 
MacMillan  as  admitting  that  ‘no  post–war 
work… would take care of more men than this 
job’…  Duchemin  pointed  to  the  ‘saving  of 
carriage costs’ that would be realized by a fixed 
link, thereby improving the ‘industrial progress’ 
of  the  province….  On 10  June 1944 he  stated 
that the crossing is long-overdue and to continue 
to ignore the need was to condemn Nova Scotia 
to ‘industrial stagnation and economic inferiority’ 
(38:72-73).  
When the Canso Causeway was built and opened for all to 
see, admire, and cross, on 13 August 1955, Transport 
Minister George Marler said that Nova Scotians could 
finally 
‘look  forward  to  the  future  with  profitable 
optimism…’ as the Causeway would foster trade 
and  stimulate  new  industries  and  ‘make  it 
possible  to  visit,  more  easily  than  before,  this 
inviting  and  friendly  vacationland.’  Premier 
Henry  Hicks  waxed  more poetic:  ‘Demands of 
increasing population have always stirred men to 
overcome difficulties  that have  seemed barriers 
to progress’ (38:76). 
But the savings did not come. The tourists did not come. 
The profit did not come. 
     But economic and ecologic decimation did.  
     Flashing forward, to 1990, the time that the Report of 
the Environmental Assessment Panel ‘recommended, 
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proceed,’ fellow islanders across the Northumberland 
straight on Cape Breton Island had long-since began to 
“associate the Causeway with decimating industrial 
activity and, as a result, reducing populations” (38:73). 
     The Causeway, ironically, had also been linked to the 
collapse the local fishery.  
The Canso Causeway may have tied Cape Breton 
to  mainland  Nova  Scotia,  but  the  Island’s 
economic situation did not improve; rather, the 
link  is  one  that  exacerbated  a  culture  of 
colonialism  and  dependence,  where  the  central 
powers extract the resources and the best minds 
out  of  its  ‘most  despised  hinterland’…  With 
official  unemployment  handing  steadily  at 
between  17  and  20  per  cent,  outmigration 
endemic, and no real changes in sight, economic 
prosperity is an elusive goal. Linking the Island to 
the  mainland  did  not  seem  to  improve  the 
relationships  between  the  entities,  even  after 
fifty years conjoined. 
     Industry  did  not  expand  significantly, 
population  declined…  As  an  industrial 
development  tool,  the  Canso  Causeway  failed 
(38:81). 
If one were to turn around and look in the other direction 
– to Quebec – two more enlightening lessons were to be 
found in the St. Lawrence. And if one were to heed von 
Humboldt’s call to become an explorer, heading down to 
Florida’s Gulf Coast would have offered yet three more 
islands. Moreover, if one  looked beyond the shores of 
North America, to Sweden, literally hundreds of 
illustrative lessons were to be learned (of which, more to 
follow).  
     Needless to say, the same pomp and circumstance, 
the same political rhetoric – nearly verbatim – conspired 
against the islands on Prince Edward Island (35). And yes, 
the Confederation Bridge linking Prince Edward Island to 
Nova Scotia was built and stands yet today.  
     Within a decade after completion of the bridge, the 
south shore fishery, once amongst the most productive in 
Canada, collapsed; all commercial species on the south 
shore are now commercially extinct. Economic and 
ecologic collapse have also occurred much more rapidly 
and with far more destructive power than that caused by 
the Canso Causeway. Although this decimation has 
analyzed and chronicled (cf. 15 ; 36-37), it is not 
surprising that several – if not most – of the aspects 
relating to this collapse have eluded analysis, as the same 
inductive methods which have been utilized to inform 
economic development strategy for the past century (i.e. 
methods lacking a theory of value, founded upon the 
inherently false and sandy inductive foundation of the 
‘social sciences’), have been utilized to assess the post-
construction economic performance. The mandate to 
drive monocrop potato production has worked-out 
fabulously well – PEI boasts the highest density potato 
production in North America, with acres in production 
nearly doubled since the completion of the Confederation 
Bridge – but it has come at an evolutionarily unstable 
price: potato blight fungicides are amongst the most toxic 
chemicals on Earth. 
     Alas, this spectacular, Naru-esque tragedy plays on yet 
into the present: the industrial agricultural objective set 
into motion in 1970 and brought into full fruition with the 
construction of the Confederation Bridge has plagued PEI 
with the poorest water quality, poorest economy, poorest 
populace, and highest cancer rates in Canada. Needless to 
say, PEI is suffering great losses and staggering defeats on 
a daily basis, not the least of which is marketing itself as 
the ‘green island,’ or ‘gentle isle.’  
And of course the greatest tragedy – the element 
which gives this drama it’s tragi-comedy quality, is that 
industrial agriculture is untenable on PEI under the best 
conditions. Farmers are restricted – by law – to 
ownership of 3,000 acres or less. The last time I checked, 
the largest potato farmer in Idaho was working a little 
over 100,000 acres. In general, PEI farmers are unable to 
produce agricultural commodities for less than they’re 
selling for on the Chicago Board of Trade. Thus, the irony 
is that the islanders are poisoning themselves and – to add 
insult to injury – losing money while they’re at it. At 
least Albertans are making $ from the oilsands. 
     But this snapshot, released 22 April 2009, really says it 
all: 
The  Green  Provincial  Report  Card,  which 
considered environmental performance across ten 
equally  weighted  categories  –  including 
greenhouse  gases,  organic  food,  green  energy, 
green  jobs,  water  use,  biodiversity  and  car 
dependency—ranked BC at  the  top of the  class 
with an overall score of 69 per cent for being tops 
in green jobs, green buildings, organic food, and 
energy efficiency. 
     Although the survey methodology adjusted for 
size of population and  economy,  Prince  Edward 
Island pulled in at the bottom of the class due to 
poor  energy  efficiency,  high  car  dependency, 
extreme paucity of protected land, and a dearth of 
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PROVINCE     TOTAL       GRADE           
        BC          69%             C+ 
        ON          67%             C+ 
        NT         66%             C+ 
        YT           57%             C- 
        NU          56%             C- 
        AB          55%             C- 
        NS          53%             D 
        SK          50%             D 
        QB     49%             F 
        MB          46%             F 
        NB          40%             F 
        NL          38%             F 
        PE          32%             F 
 
Last year, a Globe & Mail cover-story exclaimed: PEI’S 
KILLING FIELDS: 
Every summer Islanders hear about… thousands 
of  fish  dying  in  our  rivers  and  streams… 
Wednesday, three more sites were added to the 
initial list of 13 rivers and streams plagued with 
the stench of rotting… fish. And apparently the 
problem is getting worse. Environment Minister 
George  Webster  concedes  that  ‘the  trend  is 
escalating’  and  ‘there  seem  to  be  higher 
numbers’ (40:A6). 
Two weeks later (and exactly one year ago today, by the 
way), on your Author’s 40th Birthday, The Guardian asked: 
Fish kills in our rivers: Are we heeding the warning? 
The first comprehensive Atlantic salmon survey 
on Prince Edward Island in almost a decade has 
revealed  an  alarming  trend.  The  report,    A 
Conservation  Strategy  for  Atlantic  Salmon  in  Prince 
Edward Island, warns of disappearing… salmon. 
     ‘Eleven PEI rivers have lost their salmon since 
the  early  1990s,’  says  Daryl  Guignion,  the 
report’s author.  ‘Only 22 rivers presently have 
Atlantic salmon and stocks in seven of those are 
very precarious. With the current rate of loss, in 
a few years, Atlantic salmon will likely disappear 
from Prince Edward Island.’ 
     Todd  Dupuis,  director  of  regional  programs 
for  the  Atlantic  Salmon  Federation,  says  the 
report  is  an  eye-opener.        ‘We  need  to  do 
something quickly if Islanders are to continue to 
enjoy  Atlantic  salmon  in  this  province,”  said 
Dupuis.  “We  know  that  salmon  stocks  in 
Northumberland Strait rivers in New Brunswick 
and  Nova  Scotia  remain  relatively  strong 
therefore  it  seems  there  is something different 
on PEI that is causing this rapid decline.’ 
      The  recent  federal-provincial  report on  the 
high levels of nitrates in provincial groundwater 
and surfacewater should come of no surprise. 
     As a member of the provincial Round Table on 
Resource Land Use and Stewardship, I regularly 
heard  the  issue  raised  at  public  presentations. 
Nitrates were seen as a threat to the quality of 
Prince  Edward  Island’s  water  and  received 
attention in our 1997 report. Ten years later, the 
problem continues to get worse (41:A7). 
Why did this come of no surprise? Why does this problem 
persist?  
     Because the poor, alas, deviate more (cf. 42). 
     Why was the Confederation Bridge build despite the 
peril which it so clearly posed? Because it was a one billion 
dollar bridge—one billion dollars worth of jobs and 
infrastructure contracts for ‘have not’ islanders (jobs 
which were not even given to them in the end – but 
that’s another long, sad story). The Tragedy of the Commons 
may be readily taken in on any given day one (reluctantly) 
chooses to open The Guardian.  
     Populations with hungry mouths to feed and little to 
feed them with choose economic development over 
ecological preservation almost every time (though the 
people of Molokai offer a brilliant and inspiring exception 
to this rule).  
     In Islandness, PEI islander David Weale contended that 
economically,  socially,  psychologically,  the 
construction  of  a  fixed  link  will  reduce  our 
insularity.  It  moves  in  the  direction  of 
peninsularity, which as the work itself expresses, 
is a state of being almost an island (43: 82). 
It seemed to yours truly that Weale was on to 
something—that his intuition and survival instincts 
served him well—but that he was unable to fully express 
a very important message, and thus unable to make his 
case with sufficient conviction. It appeared that Weale 
was struggling to describe a desirable,  evolutionary stable 
degree of relative insularity:  the institutions, communities, 
people, economies, wildlife that biogeographical and 
politico-economic insularity engender.  
     I began to wonder if Weale’s promethean apprehension 
was founded upon an intuitive understanding that a drastic 
reduction in relative insularity represented evolutionarily 
unstable strategy.  
     In the end I concluded that Weale was right: In short, 
the islanders (i) failed to recognize that they had evolved 
and adapted to live within niches of high insularity (as did 
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of relative insularity, and thus (iii), failed to adequately 
assess the consequences of a dramatic reduction in 
relative insularity. Yes, Weale was on to something, and 
game theory happens to offer support for the critical point 
he and others  tried so desperately to make. 
     Furthermore, as I pondered Weale’s conundrum, I 
began to wonder if relative insularity could be quantified?  
What if Weale had been able to quantify what this loss of 
insularity might mean? The Funk-Carlquist Formula (cf. 1) 
represents my on-going search for a quantitative solution. 
     (15) concluded that, when islands chase continental 
economic mirages, such as the pursuit of commercial 
agriculture, sooner or later, they lose money and the 
benefits their island ecology once offered: through 
amplification-by-compression, they experience greater 
pollution-related externalities than continental 
counterparts, form greater trade-related 
interdependencies, and thus become more vulnerable to 
financial shock as well.  
     The simple solution for island development is this: Do 
as little as possible, disturb as little as possible, foster the 
healthiest environment possible, for that is and almost 
always will  be an island's greatest asset! ‘Islandness’ is any 
island’s greatest competitive advantage – insularity is 
perhaps the single, scarce commodity with which 
‘globalized economic military superpowers’ simply 
cannot compete! 
     Stewart Shepherd, one of the five economists hired 
(remarkably, all economists were from Europe, none had 
ever been to PEI) to develop and write the ill-fated plan 
of 1970  confirmed my finding. Shepherd noted the plan 
was initiated because per capita income was lower on PEI 
than in the other provinces of Canada. But as Shepard 
remarked, life expectancy and the standards of living were not 
lower.  
     Moreover, standards of living may actually have been 
much better than the rest of Canada, relatively speaking, 
prior to building the bridge. In either case, however, as 
previously noted, per capita income data is inherently 
meaningless with no Theory of Value (44 ; cf. 1). 
I attempted to convey the essence of this counter-
intuitive finding in my conclusion to a long letter to the 
Ålanders: 
The  fact  that  your  per-capita  income  ranks  so 
highly is admirable, but largely irrelevant – pay as 
little attention to this inherently meaningless [44] 
figure as possible, for if it should rise to number-
one,  in reality  you may be  worse off, and if  it 
should  fall  precipitously,  you  may  in  fact  be 
better  off.  The  best  indicator  of  your  great 
success is plain for all to see:  Your health. As the 
years pass, keep an eye on this benchmark, for, 
ideally, it should always be on the rise. If it should 
remain  flat,  be  concerned.  If  it  should  fall,  be 
alarmed (15).  
Of course PEI is not an exceptional case, it is merely an 
accurate, highly descriptive, and relatively simple model 
of the maladaptive politico-economic development 
strategy that has been (and remains) employed on most 
islands throughout the world. Maladaptation is the norm – 
not the exception – amongst island nations and sub-
national island jurisdictions, for The Tragedy of the Commons 
is so utterly common that it is extraordinarily difficult to 
find an exception to this rule, which is referred to 
regionally by various names, including The Coney Island 
Effect, The Key West Effect, and Balaericazation. 
     There are several infamous and notorious examples – 
from Easter Island to Nauru – in which The Tragedy of the 
Commons plays out until the very bitter end; and islands 
such as Phuket, Key West, Malta, Oahu, St. Martin, 
Ibiza, St. Thomas, Bermuda, Jamaica, Carriacou (cf. 45), 
Barbados (of which, more to follow), and, in fact most 
Caribbean islands (cf. 18:98-100) find themselves face-to-
face with the final curtain-call for the final act in this 
play. The highest point on Malta – visible from all points 
on the island – is the summit of the central landfill. 
Throughout St. Vincent and the Grenadines, ‘tipping’ is 
the waste-disposal method of choice: Utilizing modified 
pick-up truck beds, islanders back-up to a cliff, and ‘tip’ 
their waste into the sea. This practice has been a source 
of particular embarrassment on St. Vincent, since the 
most popular tipping cliff towers above an otherwise 
inaccessible beach at the mouth of the harbour:  As 
cruiseship passengers arrive daily (by the thousands, of 
course), their introduction to the splendours of St. 
Vincent are the rolling hills of rubbish along this beach.  
     The challenge, of course, is to identify a significant 
exception to this rule, and see what lessons it may have 
to offer—and I have done just that.  
     Though Molokai and the big island of Hawaii offer 
admirable exceptions with impressive sustainable 
economic development track-records and extraordinary 
relative insularity, Molokai’s success is based upon 
cultural cohesion, and although this appears to have offered 
a solid foundation for Icelandic ESS for ≈1000 years, the 
most recent chapter in Iceland’s history suggests perhaps 
cultural cohesion ≠ ESS afterall.  
     The big island of Hawaii is naturally well endowed—in 
fact The Funk-Carlquist Formula (cf. 1) suggests the big 
island may represent the single-most insular island on 
Earth. But this fortunate case is only partly by design (i.e. 
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due to the fact that destructive agricultural industrial 
enterprises and high-density housing developments are 
uneconomical/ impractical/impossible on the summits 
and flanks of 13,000 foot volcanoes: The Funk-Carlquist 
Formula suggests that the big island’s extraordinary relative 
insularity is attributable to interdependent factors all 
working in unison to foster extraordinary evolutionary & 
economic value:  Hegemon Military Status (46, cf. 47), vast 
land-area, the Pacific Basin, wonderful isolation, 
extraordinary fresh water reserves, considerable natural 
resources, high elevation (and thus, an unprecedented 
range of ecological zones, convection rainfall,  etc.), a 
high percentage of forested Land Area,  considerable Land 
Area protected by nature preserve, relatively low 
industrial agriculture production, no irrigated agricultural 
production, great solar and wind resources, low 
population density, and the fact that ≈10% of the island 
(≈30% of all arable land) was under the private stewardship 
of Parker Ranch from the mid-19th century until the 
present: The Tragedy of the Commons has not been able to 
wreak a fraction of the havoc it has wreaked upon Oahu 
and Maui.  
     But a truly descriptive model for RIS ESS (MEP) 
requires a smaller, far more controlled experiment; an 
island with a natural history guided more by the hand of 
human agency than by Mother nature, a politico-economic 
realm of insularity which evolved and is evolving from a 
clearly stated, politico-economic development strategy 
from day one, and had and maintains the enforcement 
mechanisms in place to achieve it. 
     Stewart Shepherd, whom I have discovered to be a 
truly wise economist, gentleman, and a scholar, readily 
concedes the PEI development plan failed to consider 
ecological factors. And although he was almost entirely 
correct when he acknowledged and defended this error by 
noting that there weren’t any economists on Earth 
factoring ecological considerations in 1969, there was at 
least one economic development plan being drafted – at 
the exact same point in time – which did.   
     There are 34 islands in the Grenadine archipelago, 
which possess very similar levels of relative insularity, 
almost no natural resources (many even lacking fresh 
water), and all fall under the same bio-geo-politico-
economic umbrella of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
(SVG) flag. SVG is the second-poorest nation in the OECS, 
and “it is notable that there are currently no 
comprehensive policies or mechanisms that address 
sustainable development in St. Vincent” (48:2). Thus SVG 
offers one of the finest laboratory for a relatively 
controlled, comparative island study of sustainable 
economic development. 
     SVG lies in the lesser Antilles, denoted as such because 
they were, quite literally, worth less in the eyes of early 
European explores than the natural resource rich, greater 
Antilles (Cuba, Jamaica, Dominica, Puerto Rico) – 
unable to merit large-scale agricultural production. And 
Mustique is certainly one of the lesser of the lesser 
Antilles: 1400 desert acres, very little fresh water, no 
EEZ, no minerals, no oil nor natural gas, heavy salt spray, 
no inductive rain-fall, no geothermal energy, no deep 
water harbours, no financial sector, no manufacturing 
sector, a runway too short for jets, one 16-room hotel, 
one 4-room B&B, one general store, two restaurants, and 
one bar. Furthermore, SVG doesn’t provide waste, 
medical, educational, police, water, fire, power, nor 
infrastructure support. Mustique is an ‘outlier,’ a data-set 
economists often ‘toss out’ as irrelevant. But the case of 
Mustique could not be any more relevant. By the central 
theorems and principles of economics, Mustique’s 
economic value could be naturally expected to be as low 
or lower (due to the lack of fresh water) than many sister 
islands in the Grenadines, and far lower than on St. 
Vincent, the main island which possesses nearly all of 
SVG’s natural resources and 90% of the ‘human capital.’ 
     But this is not what we discover on Mustique. 
     And this is exactly why this 1400 acre desert island 
models RIS ESS so well.  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
First and foremost, Mustique demonstrates that the 
foundation to any proposed plan for RIS successful 
economic development must commence with a medium-
to-long term carrying-capacity study, and facilitate the 
means for enforcing the plan’s strategy: Mustique has had 
both items in place from day-one (1970) to the present. 
     The Mustique Co. Development Plan is indeed truly 
extraordinary, and, to my knowledge, unprecedented, as 
it marks the only known instance of the ecologically 
planned development of an uninhabited island. 
     The Island Survival Game assists our search for RIS ESS, 
an island-based economic development strategy which 
cannot be ‘invaded’. In other words, the ‘island’ – be it 
in the middle of the pacific or landlocked in the middle of 
the Alps, cannot be ‘taken away’ (from the ‘islander’s 
point of view, i.e., those presently ‘holding’ the 
territory) – by force, purchase, or effectively lost as a 
result of pollution, deforestation, etc.  
     With this object in mind, consider the fact that 
Mustique was once held by Arawaks, taken away by the 
Caribbes, taken away by the French and the English, then, 
remarkably, was taken and held for some time by one man 
with a promethean vision and considerable RHP – alas, 
however, not enough. Neither tribes nor nations nor man 
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taken away once again, by The Mustique Co., a private 
organization which did deploy RIS ESS, the RIS solution to 
the Tragedy of the Commons, and thus, ultimately, the 
solution The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development. 
     At this juncture I should also underscore that 
possessing an ‘unbeatable’ strategy ≠ being literally 
‘unbeatable,’ because ESS is merely theoretical. Mustique is 
fairly vulnerable to ‘attack’ from several fronts: it has 
almost no natural insularity, and very little political 
insularity. The only insularity it has is the insularity it 
created through privatization—by fencing off the commons. 
The good  news, however, is that the only ‘invaders’ 
Mustique has to worry about are (i) Natural disasters, and 
(ii) political disasters (e.g. invasion or SVG attacking via 
nationalization). The greatest threat – the commons – has 
been effectively eliminated through privatization. 
     But even if a hurricane, VE-2+ eruption on St. 
Vincent, or a military coup should wipe out the ‘value’ 
meticulously and purposefully created on Mustique, their 
plan still models the theoretical solution to our problem. 
     The ‘founder colony’ of Prince Edward Island, in 
contrast, is losing The Island Survival Game. This fact is, 
however, not readily apparent, because Canada’s smallest 
province has generally achieved population growth over 
the past decade, but this growth is deceiving: the 
‘founder population’ – in this case, the descendants of 
Scottish Islanders who were deeded this island six 
generations ago – do not presently exhibited sufficient 
RHP to ‘hold the island’, and ‘invaders’ are rapidly taking 
it from them — although the founder population held 
steady (naturally) at ≈100,000 for nearly 150 years, 
economic development strategy founded without a Theory 
of Value is only able to prescribe endless growth – thus, 
despite the fact that the present population – 134,000 is 
well over the island’s carrying-capacity, politico-
economic incentive nonetheless offer ‘invaders’ 
significant incentives (Canadian citizenship) to ‘invade’ in 
order to maintain population growth!  The irony, of 
course, is that this ‘growth’ actually amounts – from the 
islanders perspective – to ‘loss.’ 
The Funk Line 
The inhabitants of Barbados are losing, too, and this is 
rather ironic (though perhaps predictable), considering 
the fact that “the country enjoys one of the highest per 
capita incomes in the region” (49). And, since a picture 
tells a thousand words, I have animated this illusive 
dilemma with 174,000 words in four minutes and 19 
seconds by producing a brief overview (literally), a round-
trip flight from Barbados to Mustique. This magic flight 
offers a stunning visual introduction to the amplified 
nature of The Tragedy of the Commons on islands, RIS ESS, 
and a contemporary overview of the value propositions 
diametrically opposed economic development strategies 
(MED and MEP) offer. This short, silent film also 
introduces The Funk Line, the bio-geo-politico-economic 
equivalent of The Wallace Line. 
     The Funk Line (50) brings the human agency into the 
biogeographical evolutionary equation, clearly 
demonstrating that, when comparing Mustique to 
Barbados, St. Vincent, the other 33 islands of the 
Grenadine chain, the remainder of the lesser Antilles, all 
of the greater Antilles, and almost every other warm-
water island on Earth, 
there  is  no  other  example  on  the  globe  of  an 
island so closely  surrounded by other islands on 
every  side,  yet  preserving  such  a  marked 
individuality in its forms of life;… it is, so far as 
yet known, absolutely unique (51:426). 
Cold water islands – such as the Faroes and Lofoten – are 
often applauded for their sustainability, but cold water 
island ecological preservation is, more often than not, a 
function of natural consequences (low tourist demand, 
few ecologically degrading industrial and agricultural 
opportunities to exploit, etc.), not human agency (though 
the Svalbard  archipelago may represent a notable 
exception).  
     Mustique achieved and  maintained ESS through (i) 
Colin Tennant’s privatization and promethean vision, (ii) 
the ecological principles Tenant and Money-Coutts 
established by commissioning The Mustique Co. 
Development Plan, (iii) the prudent management and 
execution of this development plan —with an emphasis 
upon gradualism – by the Honourable Brian Alexander, (iv) 
the relative insularity protected, fostered, and insured by 
ample RHP ($, The Mustique Co.) and (v) the 
constitutional and contractual agreement (free-hold land 
title) honoured by SVG.  
     Alexander was kind enough to critique my positions 
regarding Mustique, and his most fundamental criticism 
was that Mustique's success was only possible with 
extraordinary capital reserves. Others have suggested that 
Mustique does not model sustainability because it is not 
self-sufficient. However, as I have previously demonstrated 
(3), it is theoretically impossible for any ‘island’ on Earth 
to be self-sufficient (though a relatively high degree of 
self-sufficiency does = ESS).  
     Furthermore, the object of the game – RHP – makes 
no normative assumptions regarding self-sufficiency nor 
any other ‘traditions which satisfy the canons of 
rationality embraced by socialists’ (of which, more to 
follow). 
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essence of RIS ESS, contrary to findings tabled across the 
board in neoclassical economic theory, islands are not in 
fact cursed by geography, from an ‘Islands’ economic 
perspective, small-island societies are clearly saved by the 
miracle of biogeography, by the miracle of insularity. 
     Moreover, as time moves forward, the few ‘islands’ 
willing and able to embrace The Principle of Relative 
Insularity (willing and able to make an economic sacrifice 
in the present for economic and ecological value in the 
future), stand to watch the value of their evolutionary and 
politico-economic (political stability, economic 
insularity, etc.) assets (such as the increasingly rare and 
precious asset known as potable water) increase and 
become ever-more sought-after as healthy, inhabitable 
environments, tourist destinations, etc.  
     Why is tourism the largest industry on Earth? Because 
humans consistently reveal the universal preference for relative 
insularity. 
     In many—if not most—regards, The Prince Edward 
Island Development Plan was executed brilliantly – over the 
past forty years this “Federal-Provincial Program for 
Social and Economic Advancement” has achieved very 
near what it was formulated to do. The problem was and 
remains, however, that it adopted a strategy based upon 
economic principles which were not supported by any 
theory of value (44). The Mustique Co. Development 
Plan demonstrated an intuitive understanding of the true 
value of relative insularity. The PEI plan does not. 
     These diametrically opposed plans yielded completely 
opposite and unintended results. 
     Remarkably, The Prince Edward Island Development Plan, 
which set the path for the intense economic development 
of an island (relatively rich in natural resources – i.e. the 
fisheries and some of the most fertile, tillable soil in all of 
Canada) with no regard for the ecology. The result was 
short-term economic gain followed by both ecological & 
economic collapse, and dwindling RHP (the population is 
rapidly aging, out-migrating, fertility rates falling, caner 
rates rising, and population growth has only been achieved 
through offer incentives to ‘invaders’). Despite its 
mounting ecological problems, rapidly deteriorating 
fresh-water supply, and despite the fact that tourism now 
represents the largest industry (≈1MM tourist visits per 
year), to this date, PEI has never commissioned nor 
conducted a carrying-capacity study. 
     The Mustique plan, however, mandated the ecological 
preservation of a relatively worthless scrap of desert 
surround by water (the island was generally viewed 
uninhabitable when Tenant purchased it in the 1950’s; 
moreover, in reality, without The Mustique Co.’s RHP, 
it would remain uninhabitable), with very little, entirely 
secondary emphasis upon economic development—the 
plan also clearly stipulates that economic success would 
only be achievable through extraordinary measures 
ecological preservation and extraordinarily strict land-use-
policies.  
     Several recent investigations offer various degrees of 
support to our central thesis: comparative studies on Cape 
Breton Island, Honeymoon, Caladesi, & Anclote, Swedin 
and two curious little gems in the St. Lawrence River, 
Ile d’Orleans and Ile aux Coudres (cf. 1), all testify – 
offering various degrees of support – to the value of 
relative insularity, and, moreover, support this 
hypothesis: RIS ESS=MEP. 
     Most importantly, of course, we begin to recognize 
the manner in which we may deploy this strategy. How 
was ESS achieved on Mustique?  By simply fencing off the 
‘commons’; theoretically, The Tragedy of the Commons can 
not occur on Mustique: there is no ‘commons’ – it has 
been fenced off and would require a 2/3rd’s majority vote 
(by the shareholders of The Mustique Co.) to re-instate. 
     Many have suggested that this solution is impossible to 
achieve on islands under the control of democratic action. 
At first blush, it may seem that this is a valid point—but 
it is not. In fact, this economic development strategy is 
incredibly easily to deploy – it’s just that most societies 
are unwilling to endure elect the short-term sacrifices 
necessary to achieve it. It has – and is presently, afterall, 
being effectively achieved on the island of Molokai, and 
would most highly recommend those interested in this 
extraordinary case to explore it thoroughly; but our 
exploration today is limited to the exploration of the 
theoretical model – not a practical applications thereof. 
Let’s take a moment to reflect back upon Table 1. 
     Based upon my current estimates, Mustique, a small, 
water-less, natural resource-void island satellite of one of 
the most impoverished Caribbean nations, commands 
undeveloped (bare-land) values amongst the highest 
anywhere on Earth ($2MM USD/undeveloped acre and 
approximately $20MM USD/home). Their ecosystem is 
perhaps the healthiest in the Caribbean, standards of living 
are easily the highest, and it is the second-largest 
employer in SVG (second only to the government)! 
     But it did not happen by accident, it did not happen 
overnight, and it may come of little surprise that The 
Mustique Co. was cash-flow negative from 1958-1988. 
     MEP requires sacrifice, a sacrifice the homogenous 
inhabitants (perhaps a key trait) of Molokai have, once 
again – time after time – elected to endure for the sake 
of their children’s children.  
     If you take a moment to review the opening of my 
letter to the Ålanders, you may recognized that many of 
the ‘islands I love’ have ‘fenced-off’ 30-75% ‘commons’ 
by designating it as nature preserve. That’s all it takes!  Page 15 of 17 
     For example, although we will not burdened ourselves 
with detailed strategies which are decidedly unwanted, 
the Prince Edward Island provincial government could, for 
example, simply do what they did in 1970: buy land. But 
this time around, instead of clearing all the hedgerows and 
forest tracts, then repackaging them as monocrop potato 
farms, they could simply add to the miniscule 3% of land 
area under protection as nature preserves, or, once again, 
they did throughout the 1970’s, repackage the land in 
smaller package with a few strings attached (land-use 
policies, i.e., certified organic designation) attached. The 
government, if effectively ruled by rational people, could 
simply perform the same function The Mustique Co. has 
provided – protection from the commons. Alternatively, any 
private citizen, corporation, or cooperative with adequate 
RHP ($) could perform the same function – that’s exactly 
what Percival P. Baxter and several others did in the U.S. 
state of Maine (cf. 52-53), and that is exactly what Ted 
Turner (cf. 54) has done with two million rangeland acres – 
rangelands totalling more than twice the size of Prince Edward 
Island. 
     Yes, the solution is simple.  
     But the problem is that most people would rather have 
a little money now (even at the expense of the 
environment in which they live), rather than a lot of 
money (and a healthy environment) later. 
     So the tragedy plays on. Remarkably, PEI has no 
comprehensive land-use policy to this very day. 
     But I must also emphasize that, although the 
Confederation Bridge has amplified innumerable, inter-
connected problems for Prince Edward Islanders, it is 
neither the true source of the problem and the problem is 
far from insoluble. It seems that I should re-state that the 
bridge was merely the extension of The Prince Edward 
Island Plan for Economic Development which had commenced 
in earnest in 1970. As a wise Fulbright scholar recently 
discovered (while exploring the lack of relative insularity 
on Prince Edward Island and the differing insularities of 
three islands off the Gulf coast of Florida): 
The romance of islands is often used by marketers 
of tourism as an enticing characteristic of their 
advertised destination. According to Tom Baum, 
small  islands  are  popular  tourist  destinations 
because  of  their  remoteness,  boundedness,  and 
insularity—a  combination  of  characteristics 
David  Weale  calls  islandness.  Royle  and  others 
comment that this concept of islandness can be 
diminished or lost altogether when a fixed link, 
such  as  a  bridge,  causeway,  or  tunnel  is 
established between the island and the mainland. 
     Ilan  Kelman  states  that  insufficient  research 
has been done regarding the degree to which an 
island’s insularity, or islandness, is lost when it is 
linked to the mainland: 
In  debating  the  construction  of  fixed 
links, fears are often expressed about the 
expected  loss  of  island  characteristics. 
Working out how much ‘islandness; has 
been  lost  due  to  a  fixed  link  is 
difficult…. 
Proponents of  the  link have  said  that  it 
will only enhance the Island way of life. 
That  is  quite  absurd.  You  might 
reasonably argue that it will enhance the 
economy of the province, or that it will 
make travelling on an off the Island more 
convenient,  but  you  cannot  reasonably 
argue that it will enhance the Islandness 
of  our  way  of  life.  You  can  no  more 
enhance the Island way of life by building 
a  fixed  link  than  you  can  enhance  the 
forest  by  cutting  down  the  trees. 
Economically,  socially,  psychologically, 
the  construction  of  a  fixed  link  will 
reduce our insularity…. There is nothing 
wrong  with  that,  but  we  should  not 
pretend that  it  makes no difference (cf. 
55:3). 
Yes, the bridge has helped reduce insularity to the nadir 
of evolutionary instability – but of course this bridge is a 
powerful lever which can be pulled in either direction:  
For example, as feared by many promethean islanders, the 
bridge has opened the gates for low-cost and pork which 
have decimated island farms and farmers.  And, presently, 
the toll for a transport truck is not much more than that 
for a passenger vehicle ($42 CAD).  Want to increase 
insularity for island farmers?  Increase relative insularity 
by raise the toll for transport trucks as needed (e.g. $500, 
$1000, $5000).  Want to give the islanders a competitive 
advantage?  Wipe out their tolls entirely ($0) as 
demanded and received by the inhabitants of Skye.  My 
point is that it is actually possible to increase islandness to 
a point in which it is actually greater than it was prior to 
the building of the bridge.   
     And, to close on another positive note I’ll very briefly 
illustrate yet another sketch of one more archipelago 
which I love above all others: the Roque archipelago. This 
illustration is especially excellent, as we’re able to see 
how recognizing The Principle of Relative Insularity often 
is so close to so many, yet dangles just out-of-reach. 
Consider, for example, this passage from my June 2009 
issue of Blue Water Sailing:  Page 16 of 17 
Roque island is a special place… What makes it 
so  special  has  to  be  the  combination  of 
remoteness  and appearance of almost  a  mile  of 
white  pine-topped,  craggy  islands  all  around  it 
(56:39).  
Although I do agree with this author that Roque is ‘a 
special place’, this ‘combination’ is not what ‘makes it so 
special’. However, a bit further down the page the author 
stumbled upon the truth: “The island and surrounding 
islands are private and have been in the same family for 
almost 200 years” (56:39, cf. 57). We may also speculate 
that, perhaps our fellow blue water sailor was aware of 
this profound truth, but was afraid to say it. As I’ve noted, 
these truths are unpopular, and writers and publishers who 
want to sell popular magazines often side-step unpopular 
truths.  
     But for those strong enough to face difficult truths, for 
those who have not let germs of corruption enter into 
their souls, the solution to The Problem of Sustainable 
Economic Development—arguably the most fundamental 
problem on earth—requires little more than recognizing 
The Principle of Relative Insularity, understanding and 
adopting the ESS which best attains and maintains relative 
insularity—by applying strategy, which has, to various 
degrees, been successfully deployed on many islands (such 
as Mustique, Molokai, Roque, North Haven, and on over 
two million acres of Ted Turner’s ‘island’ ranches ). 
     In all cases—be it managing a ranch or a small island’s 
natural resources – the tools, considerations, and 
mechanisms are straightforward and largely the same: (i) 
Carrying-Capacity, (ii) Gradualism, (iii) Optimum Habitat 
Condition (58), and (iv) RHP. 
     However, despite the escalating din of ideological 
environmentalist, as clearly demonstrated in (1), (59-60) 
were both correct, the evolutionary stable economic 
development strategy for GEMS ≠ MEP—but we’ll save 
that thought for another day. 
     “This sketch is most imperfect; but in so short a space 
I cannot make it better. Your imagination must fill up 
very wide blanks” (14:6). 
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